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Alexithymia, as a theoretical psychotherapeutic construct, finds its origins in
psychosomatic medicine, actually being quite old. However, beyond the specific
observations and case studies, their characterization and systematization is relatively
recent. However, from an epistemological point of view, it remains the subject of debate
and therefore remains outside the conventional diagnostic guidelines. Possibly, its history,
closely linked to psychoanalysis, as well as the lack of clear empirical references, has
turned the alexithymia construct before into a good descriptive and comprehensive
framework than in a precise diagnostic model. In this article it is, following the thread
conduits of the historical perspective, to deepen these epistemological aspects.
Keywords: alexithymia, history, therapeutic models, psychosomatic medicine, theoretical constructsINTRODUCTION
Psychosomatic medicine in general is based on the principle that emotions and personality have an
impact on bodily functions, and thereby play a part in physical wellbeing or illness. Nevertheless,
because the mechanisms of these interactions are not clear, very few of its explanatory models have
gained the consideration of research paradigm (1). In fact, today’s psychosomatic model dates back
to the explanations provided by Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) on the understanding of neurosis,
whereby it has its origin in the theoretical bases of the orthodox psychoanalytical model that
summarily contends that the intrapsychic conflict that explains both the genesis and development of
the structuring of personality, together with its pathologies, prompts a high level of emotional
activation that may cause more or less serious damage to the organism (2). This hypothesis has been
widely debated for decades inasmuch as it was complicated to establish clear empirical references to
support it, which gave rise to far-reaching controversies that even affected the very development of
psychoanalysis as a school, giving rise to a broad diversification of the heterodoxy (3). Nevertheless,
the appearance of the construct of alexithymia appeared to go some way to resolving many of these
inconsistencies by finding quantifiable empirical referents that rekindled the interest in different
biological aspects of Freud’s controversial theory (4).
Nonetheless, and beyond Freud, the issue enjoys a long-standingmedical tradition, which would in due
course be consolidated within the field of psychiatry, as throughout the 19th century it seemed clear that
emotion, personality, and health were closely related. This meant that professionals soon raised theg January 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 10261
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functions and physical states (5). Thus, for example, the US
surgeon William Beaumont (1785–1853) established that fear and
anger reduced the amount of gastric mucus secreted (6). The same
may be said in relation to the first controlled studies on hypnosis, as a
British surgeon called James Braid (1795–1860) used experimental
means to prove that patients subject to hypnotic suggestion suffered
less physical pain during surgical procedures (7). It therefore stands to
reason that a school of medical inspiration in origin, such as Freudian
psychoanalysis, and inspired by the work undertaken by the
neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893) in La Salpêtrière
Hospital in Paris, should embrace these and other findings in its
explanation of the causes and consequences of neurotic processes.
The widespread dissemination of approaches of this nature,
which converged in the psychosomatic hypothesis, specifically
took place in the 1940s and 1950s by the hand of doctors trained
in psychoanalysis, such as Franz Gabriel Alexander (1891–1964)
and Felix Deutsch (1884–1964), among others (1). Indeed, the
psychosomatic paradigm added emphasis to the role of conflicts
of the unconscious by generating states of chronic activation in
patients in physiological pathologies, and even in some kind of
tissue alterations. As is logical, this hypothesis, focusing on the
organic effects of emotion, involved a new approach to therapy,
inasmuch as it was assumed that together with psychogenic and
biological aspects, environmental stresses would also have an
important part to play in the origin and development of all
nature of complaints, as factors that would also alter an
individual’s emotional state to a greater or lesser extent (8).
We should note, however, that despite the importance these
authors gave to the intrapsychic conflict, the aim here was not to
uphold a psychoanalytical approach linked to Freudian
orthodoxy, as the pathogenic mechanism would not be actually
symbolic, but instead of a psychobiological nature (9).
Whatever the case, the psychosomatic model based on an
individual’s internal conflict was backed by scant empirical
evidence, whereby it began to be seriously questioned toward
the end of the 1950s; above all because the therapeutic model
based on psychoanalytical models did not appear to provide
results that were both uniform and consistent. Although certain
patients made headway in reducing the physical symptoms of
their disorders, others, especially when they manifested
development-related problems, only appeared to record clear
benefits related to their physiological problems when they
underwent other kinds of psychodynamic therapies of
psychological support, such as the well-known brief
psychodynamic therapy. In fact, some even worsened when
they were prompted to look for the unconscious reasons for
their motivations, a situation that ultimately raised doubts about
the psychosomatic approach itself (10, 11).ALEXITHYMIA AS A MODEL
The crisis of the therapeutic model based on psychoanalysis for
addressing psychosomatic problems did not question the
existence of such problems, as their clinical evidence seemedFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 2clear and consistent, but instead the way of explaining them with
a view to seeking alternative approaches. This means that the
concept of alexithymia was not the result of an eureka moment,
but instead emerged in the early 1970s following a protracted
period of reflection and the evaluation of sundry alternative
hypotheses (1).
Back in 1948, a psychiatrist of Swiss origin called Jürgen
Ruesch (1910–1995) reported finding a unique casuistic among
his patients: those that experienced topical psychosomatic
complaints—such as migraines, abdominal disorders, and
hypertension, as well as other chronic physiological
complaints, were characterized by being scarcely imaginative,
as well as having problems with the verbal and symbolic
expression of emotions different to those usually found in
patients with disorders other than somatic symptoms (12).
Before being seen as a disorder of neurotic origin, this problem
was considered a difficulty arising from a deficient personality
development, understanding this to be the main cause of
psychosomatic disorders. Along these same lines, and around
the same time, authors such as the US neuroscientist Paul
MacLean (1913–2007), known for his popular triune brain
theory, contended that patients with psychosomatic complaints
encountered difficulties in expressing their feelings, speculating
with the possibility that this might be due to a weak
consolidation of the areas of the neocortex related to language
processing: the emotions that caused the patient significant
distress were not suitably symbolized, whereby they were
manifested through what was referred to as “organic
language” (13).
In the early 1950s, even psychoanalysts themselves began to
encounter a growing number of cases that broke with the
traditional model of intrapsychic conflict. Thus, for example,
Karen Horney (1885–1952) first reported that some of her
patients were immune to psychoanalytical treatment due to a
significant lack of emotional awareness, little expression of their
internal states, a minimal interest in their dreams and fantasies,
excessive focus on thoughts and, as a result, pursued a superficial
life-style focused on outside experience (14). Nonetheless, what
was of interest to Horney was that this type of patient was prone
to develop psychosomatic problems, eating disorders, polydrug
use and, in general, all kinds of compulsive behaviors that, it
seems, were closely related to the systematic avoidance of the
understanding of their own emotions and a profound feeling of
emptiness. What is important, at this point, is that despite
admitting that these people did not fit into the traditional
model for explaining neurosis, nor respond well to
psychoanalytical therapy, Horney sought to attribute their
behavior to the existence, in these individuals, of powerful and
deeply rooted defenses against unconscious conflicts (1). This
approach began to change among the advocates of
psychoanalysis barely a decade later, with the appearance of
specialists that began to reject the model of neurotic defense in
favor of a more eclectic approach. This was when the notion
began to be accepted that these patients’ behavior would involve,
above all, personality deficits: given the lack of a rich inner life,
these people focused their concerns on their organic symptomsJanuary 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1026
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“operational thinking”, which ended up having a very negative
impact on their interpersonal skills (15, 16).
Nevertheless, and despite the increasing amount of data on
this specific type of patient in the clinical literature, it was not
until the mid-1960s that the US psychiatrist John Case Nemiah
(1918–2009) and his Greek-born colleague Peter Emanuel
Sifneos (1920–2008) jointly embarked upon a systematic study
of the cognitive style of a sample of individuals with common
and persistent psychosomatic problems (17, 18). They came to
the conclusion that compared to individuals with standard
mental disorders, many of those that reported these associated
physiological complaints found it extremely difficult to describe
their subjective feelings, apart from having an impoverished
fantasy, as well as a utilitarian cognitive style focusing on the
outside. This unusual psychological concept was what in 1972
Sifneos coined as ‘alexithymia’, which is formed by the roots of
several Greek words, and literally means “lack of words for
emotion” (18–20).
1
Following the publication of these initial empirical findings,
alexithymia began to quickly gain in popularity among
practitioners of psychiatry and psychology. This was especially
the case after two international conferences; the first held in
London in 1972 and the second in Heidelberg in 1976, which
established the importance of the alexithymia model in research
into states of emotional deficit (18). In fact, following the London
conference, it became clear that despite the contradictory views
held by clinical and non-clinical specialists, there was a need to
give the term uniformity when addressing problems of this kind
if the aim was to ultimately find a framework of consensus that
would pave the way for communication between basic and
applied science. Hence it was agreed to replace the fuzzy
concept of ‘affection’ by the more precise term of ‘emotion’ for
all its somatic aspects, while the term ‘feeling’ was reserved for its
cognitive components (18).
The truth is that a clear convergence swiftly appeared in
the literature between a vast number of therapists and the
model propounded by Nemiah and Sifneos. But it was not
alone. The result was that the first empirical studies on
alexithymia provided unidirectional results that soon
consolidated a clear explanatory model based on four
elementary premises: 1) difficulty in identifying and
describing feelings; 2) difficulty in distinguishing between
feelings and bodily sensations related to emotional
activation; 3) restrained and limited imaginative processes,
adopting the guise of an impoverished fantasy; and 4) a
cognitive style oriented toward the outside (1). It is worth
stressing, nonetheless, that alexithymia seemed to manifest
itself in an unusual and paradoxical manner, as at first glance
the patients appeared to express a strong sense of
melancholy, with chronic dysphoria, or else outbursts of
tears and anger. Nevertheless, following an in-depth1a (a) or “no”; lέxiς (lexis) or “speech/word”; qυmός (zümós) or “emotion/mind”.
While the noun lέxiς in turn comes from the verb lέgw, which means “read”,
which provides the double meaning (adapted from the Spanish version by
Lusiardo and Rodrigo (21).
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 3interview, a specialist found that in reality these people
knew quite little about their internal states and were often
incapable of effectively relating them to memories, specific
situations, or recurring fantasies (9). The important thing is
that the approach taken by Nemiah and Sifneos allowed
superseding the classical psychoanalytical proposal that
used the link between the repressed effect and the somatic
symptoms to shift the understanding of alexithymia toward a
view close to developmental psychology: an alexithymic one,
due to an inefficient psychological development that
converged in a dysfunctional adult personality, would
experience serious difficulties when cognitively integrating
the effects, which would stop the patient being properly
regulated and modulated. This would prompt, on the one
hand, the usual communicative problems that are typical of
the disorder and, and on the other, a clear vulnerability to
experience a growing tension informed by non-differentiated
states of unpleasant emotional activation (22).
Indeed, certain cases of alexithymia provided evidence of
neurotic conflict in the classical sense of the concept, but it
was soon evident that alexithymia could both be found in the
very origin of these conflicts and strengthen others arising
during its development, thereby revealing that the main
problem of alexithymia was not so much one of neurosis,
but the poor emotional regulation that its emotional deficits
caused and, furthermore, pointed to an organic substrate
(23). In view of this state of affairs, it was perfectly possible
that intrapsychic conflicts could be one of the causes of the
disorder, although they were undoubtedly not the main one,
as psychoanalysts had believed for decades. In fact,
alexithymia had transformed, largely, into describing
someone with problems when cognitively processing
emotions with complete independence of their origin and
intensity. In fact, subsequent research both from the field of
developmental psychology and from neuropsychology has
found that the root of alexithymia could lie in either a
problem of cerebral organization, or in a marked lack of
suitable emotional models during the passage from
childhood to adulthood, or else a combination of both
factors (24, 25).A DEBATED MODEL
In view of the approaches considered, Sifneos soon proposed a
general etiological model for alexithymia that, to begin with,
subdivided it into two types: primary and secondary. The
primary one had its origin in a neuroanatomical or
physiological defect, possibly hereditary in nature, whereby the
communication between the limbic system and the neocortex
would not function properly, affecting hemispherical
lateralization, which would lead to an inability to associate
fantasies, thoughts, and languages with emotions. The
secondary one, in turn, is associated with psychological
traumas in childhood, serious and prolonged traumatic
aggressions in adulthood, or psychodynamic sociocultural
factors that prompt an overuse of defensive mechanisms suchJanuary 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1026
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without a clear empirical corroboration, this etiological
explanation was based solely on clinical observations and case
studies. Hence the reason that, in the first instances, the model of
alexithymia proposed by Nemiah and Sifneos faced
major opposition.
The first thing that was challenged was the fact that the
proposal was based, as we have already stated, on scant empirical
information, which meant there was no point in validating it
inasmuch as it had not been properly verified (1). Indeed, it was a
valid criticism insofar that many clinicians believed they had
found an explanatory panacea for the somatic symptoms, which
led to the misinterpretation of their own particular clinical
experiences as a corroboration of the construct’s validity when,
in reality, what was happening was that they appeared to be
fitting them subjectively to a pre-established model that had
never been verified (26). Yet the second great reticence caused by
the model of alexithymia was that it led to the commission of a
serious mistake in interpretation: many researchers assumed the
existence of a specific and consolidated relationship between
alexithymia and the whole known raft of classic psychosomatic
symptoms, when the truth is that the construct had been defined,
rather than as a cause, as a factor of risk. Alexithymia thus
heightened the patient’s vulnerability toward psychosomatic
disorders, but the efficient variables that prompted were others
linked to the management of emotions, such as badly resolved
situations of grief, poverty, and abandon, for example (2). In view
of this, the most critical views estimated that the so-called
“alexithymic characteristics” could be explained more
effectively through directly observable factors, such as
socioeconomic status or other variables of a situational nature,
such as adverse life events, which prompted the patient to adopt
systemized defensive strategies of resistance, negotiation, and
negation, which again opened the door to a psychodynamic
interpretation of the problem (27). This is the context that gave
rise to new and popular psychoanalytical reviews of the
construct, such as the one proposed by the New Zealander
Joyce McDougall (1920–2011), who coined the phrase
“emotionally deaf and dumb” to refer to patients suffering
from alexithymia. McDougall, who chose to elude the
intrapsychic conflict to concentrate on the problem of
symbolic linguistic representation, linked alexithymia, and
psychosis when finding that a psychotic and alexithymic
patient treated language in a similar, but opposite way, which
possibly means that both their pathological manifestations had a
common origin. She thus explained that the psychotic patient
tries to make up for their psycho-emotional deficits through the
delirious use of words in order to overcome their anxiety, while
the alexithymic patient tackled their anxiety by emptying their
words of emotional meanings, which induced the psychosomatic
disorder. This explained, in her view, why the psychotic patient
expressed their delirium in a mental order, while the alexithymic
one expressed their delirium in a physiological way (28).
On the other hand, and as an alternative critical pathway,
transcultural studies had established the notion that neither the
psychosomatic symptoms nor the verbal expression of emotionsFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 4were universal, being mediated by specific cultural attitudes
toward life events, as well as by the restrictions imposed by
language in each case. Nevertheless, the response to this
objection by the advocates of the model of alexithymia was
that it was unlikely that sociocultural and language aspects could
explain manifestations of alexithymia such as the reduction in
imagination, impoverished fantasy, or poor symbolization, and
they reproached their critics, who were generally behavioral
therapists, that their analysis model did not even consider
these kinds of hypotheses insofar as it had either clearly
ignored them or studied them only superficially and with little
theoretical rigor (1). Accordingly, those that defended the
construct would say that they were not in this case faced with
a question of “believing or not believing” in it, or of a problem
intrinsically related to its internal validity, but instead with an
epistemological difficulty that was due rather to the type of
scientific paradigm it was analyzed from (29). In fact, other
dimensional models based on internal hypotheses had proven
their utility within the clinical field and in psychopathological
research such as, for example, that of introversion-extroversion,
and this was due to the fact that, like alexithymia, they should not
be understood as a mere diagnosis, but instead as a personality
trait (1). Nevertheless, Sifneos was convinced of the construct’s
validity, and of the fact that sooner or later he would find
empirical proof of the same, as in 1973 he introduced a simple
questionnaire, the Sifneos Alexithymia Questionnaire (SAQ) to
be administered to patients in daily clinical practice. This
screening test consisted of 17 items, of which eight referred to
key issues for revealing a patient’s symptoms of alexithymia (30).
This instrument was subsequently reformulated by Sifneos
himself, converting it into the Beth Israel Hospital
Questionnaire (BIQ-1), comprising 21 items to be completed
by the actual therapist based on their observations, which raised
doubts about its objectivity insofar as the possibility of obtaining
emotional results from the patient varied depending on the
interviewer’s experience (20, 31).
Indeed, neuropsychological research came to the aid of the
alexithymia paradigm inasmuch as it detected, for example, that
those patients that underwent a commissurotomy, or surgical
incision into the callosal commissure, experienced, as the model
predicted, many of the cluster of symptoms traditionally
associated with the complaint: the visual-spatial information,
with a major emotive content, processed by the right hemisphere
of the brain, no longer travelled freely to the left hemisphere to be
sequentially segmented and reformulated in a verbal format.
These patients therefore encountered all kinds of difficulties
when symbolizing, imagining, fantasizing, or expressing
themselves emotionally, which made alexithymia, at least in
functional terms, into a phenomenon that was the complete
opposite to creativity (32).
In sum, the verbalization and use of emotions involved a
transfer of data, with a transduction or change in the type of
information contained in the same, between the limbic system
and the cortex, as well as between both hemispheres of the brain,
which is precisely the problem affecting the alexithymic patient.
Consequently, the progressive clarification of the brain structuresJanuary 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1026
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light on the model, at least in part, and helped to explain the fact
that alexithymia often appeared in patients linked to substance
abuse, sociopathic or borderline personality traits, eating
disorders, panic attacks, somatoform disorders, or psychogenic
pain (18). Moreover: as opposed to Horney’s aforementioned
opinion, attributing the shortcomings of psychoanalysis in these
individuals to a firmly entrenched resistance to the unconscious,
what really explained why traditional psychodynamic therapies
fell short with these patients, specifically those of a primary
nature, was that because of their organic difficulties for
imagining, fantasizing, or visualizing situations, such
therapeutic approaches were of little use and could even
be counterproductive.THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE
CONSTRUCT
The advancement in the understanding of the neurological bases
of alexithymic manifestations, as well as the slow but steady
progress made in the clinical field, prompted numerous attempts
to strengthen it through theoretical refinement and the collation
of data gathered from exploratory sample studies. The first
attempt, barely concealed among many professionals, involved
dissociating insofar as possible alexithymia from the temptation
to explain it solely in psychoanalytical terms and, of course,
reinforce it in such fields as neuropsychology, developmental
psychology, and personality psychology. This gave rise, to
mention just one example, to studies that sought to influence
the emotional symbolic development of children and
adolescents, as well as their expression of emotions, in
connection with the stages of development described by Jean
Piaget (1896–1980). As is common knowledge, Piaget contended
that psychological growth began with the acknowledgement of
one’s own physiological bodily conditions, and culminated in the
cognitive recognition of the psychological states of others,
whereby psycho-emot iona l deve lopment and the
communication of emotions were key elements both in
individuals’ cognitive development and in the proper
formation and consolidation of their personality (33). In short,
the well-consolidated higher psychological processes that are the
hallmark of the healthy adult, as propounded early on by the
Austrian doctor Max Schur (1897–1969), were only possible
largely through a progressive desomatization of the
individual (34).
Based on these approaches, of psychoanalytical resonance in
origin, subsequent developmental psychology focused its
attention on, among other things, the way of symbolizing and
integrating emotions, as well as their communicative functions,
in keeping with the cognitive mechanisms involved in their
regulation and modulation (22). This involved a basic line of
research for the theoretical consolidation of the model of
alexithymia inasmuch as, it seems, these mechanisms were
absent, or were at least dysfunctional, in alexithymic patients,
which rendered them vulnerable to the stresses generated in theFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 5non-differentiated states of emotional excitement that explained
the disorder (1). Nevertheless, and in view of its own diagnostic
conditions, given that it involved a descriptive concept based not
on an illness but instead informed by the patient’s complaint of
one or more basic pains, there persists—and still persists in some
way—the handicap of deciding whether alexithymia could be
considered a personality trait in the true sense of the meaning or
a state, which prompted the need to suitably evaluate both
aspects (35). The fact that alexithymia was linked to different
psychosomatic complaints may have led to its premature
acceptance, and not necessarily the right one, of the existence
of a direct relationship between alexithymia and psychosomatic
illness, which constituted a problem when assessing the construct
because the clinical observation found both psychosomatic
patients that were not alexithymic and alexithymic patients
that did not record any psychosomatic malaise whatsoever
(31). In fact, a constant when addressing therapy with these
kinds of patients was the scant literature on their treatment, as
individuals with alexithymia rarely sought help on their own
accord, and generally ended up visiting a specialist at the behest
of someone close to them who was frustrated by their
communicative shortcomings or on the advice of a medical
practitioner confused by their constant physical complaints
that were difficult to determine and resisted traditional medical
treatment (36).
This may explain why it was thought that the solution for
addressing alexithymia, which in clinical practice was both a
recurring and unquestionable phenomenon, would come from
its controlled assessment through instruments. Sifneos himself,
aware of the methodological limitations inherent to BIQ-1, did
not take long to present BIQ-2, in this case a self-assessment scale
consisting of semi-structured questions that patients were
required to answer and, in theory, provided the therapist with
first-hand information over and above that gathered during the
clinical interview (37). This led to other measures such as the
Schalling-Sifneos Personality Scale, the Alexithymia Scale of Noël,
and the widely used Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS) (38). They
were accompanied by structured interview procedures, such as
the Alexithymia Provoked Response Questionnaire (APQR) (39),
as well as the combined use of the appropriate tools with other
common psychodiagnostic tests such as MMPI, TAT, and AT-9
in order to obtain more complete observations (31). All this led
to a fairly accurate profile of an average person with alexithymia
—generally a male who reported their first complaints at a
mature age—as well as an epidemiological interest that
revealed that this complaint was more frequent among the
general population than initially thought, with the impact of
alexithymia, furthermore, varying depending on the specific
populations under study, but not in transcultural studies: more
common among patients with psychosomatic complaints than
among patients with other health issues; more common among
those addicted to psychoactive substances and, in general, with
an impact of between 8% and 10% in the normal undiagnosed
population (31).
The gradual severance of the close bond that had historically
been forged between alexithymia and psychosomatic painJanuary 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1026
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calibrating the construct’s validity in sundry fields, both
psychosociological and cultural ones and regarding the field of
health. Indeed, the focus began to turn toward alexithymia as a
personal condition and not simply as a mere medical problem, or
solely due to a diagnosable medical disorder. Thus for example,
and given the shortcomings in the emotional management of
alexithymia, it was thought that a parallel model of analysis could
be established between alexithymia and psychopathy given the
latter’s popular characterization by Hervey Cleckley (1903–
1984), who among other things described a psychopath as
having a significant deficit in the management and
understanding of emotions. This led to a systemic study of the
relationships between psychopathy and alexithymia in a sample
of women by comparing the results obtained on the PCL-R
psychopathy checklist of Robert Hare (b. 1934) and the measure
of alexithymia provided by the TAS scale (40). Despite the
similarity in the deficiency of the emotional manifestations
affecting both constructs, and possibly constituting one of its
main symptoms, it was found that they were not interchangeable
insofar as they did not refer to the same thing, nor did they
measure equivalent or correlative aspects of emotion.
The end result was a set of evidence that was difficult to doubt
regarding the construct of alexithymia. The first and key piece of
evidence was its undoubtable entity. In fact, although subject to
permanent criticism, even its detractors had to accept its
advantageous nature as an operational element, whereby a raft
of clinical features subsumed beneath a single concept and
systematically affected a specific group of disorders and
patients with very specific characteristics (41). Thus, and
despite its non-introduction—at least for the time being—in
standard diagnostic classifications because of its debated status—
trait versus state—those in favor of the model found a way of
defending with assurances that although it could not be
acknowledged as a diagnostic entity in its own right, it had the
intrinsic value of characterizing and operationalizing a long
history of psycho-medical observations of great social import
which, until their appearance and systematization, had remained
within the sphere of the undefined, thereby generating some
considerable perplexity among specialists and the inconsistent
treatment of patients (42).RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
ALEXITHYMIA
From the described perspective, recent research has focused on
exploring the links of alexithymia, understood as a stable
personality trait present in some patients, and various medical
and psychiatric conditions. For example, a study of relationships
between insight and alexithymia in adult outpatients diagnosed
with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) showed that the
subjects of the sample that obtained higher scores on the TAS-
20 scale also reflected poor or absent insight (43). Similarly,
further work has established clear connections between body
image disturbances and alexithymia in women with severeFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 6premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PDD) and patients with
serious binge eating disorder (BDD). In the last case,
moreover, the presence of alexithymia not only impoverished
the evaluation and bodily satisfaction of individuals, but also
seemed to increase depressive symptoms (44–46).
The relationships between alexithymia and other organic
conditions have also been investigated, such as the presence of
acute phase proteins—especially C-reactive protein— lipid levels,
cholesterol, and cytokine imbalance, with special attention at the
area of drug naïve outpatients diagnosed with other pathologies,
such as OCD, major depression (MD), or panic disorder (PD).
The results seem to establish links between alexithymic patients
with OCD, MD, and PD and the presence of poor cholesterol
regulation and high suicide ideation (47–49). Also, in line with
the “stress-alexithymia hypothesis”, there seems to be a clear
relationship between the high presence of C-reactive protein in
blood and alexithymia. This connection motivates that the pro-
inflammatory and anti-inflammatory cytokine balance may be
tuned toward a pro-inflammatory imbalance with a concomitant
altered cell-mediated immunity. These results point to the idea
that the presence of alexithymic features in the patient should
encourage more comprehensive therapeutic approaches, both
medical and psychological, that could prevent the development
of more severe diseases in alexithymic patients and, logically,
improve their quality of life (50).
However, one of the main lines of research in the field is the
risk of suicide, and there is a wide literature that seems to
coincide in the fact that the presence of alexithymic traits in
the individuals significantly increases suicidal behavior. Initially,
it was thought that alexithymia, in suicides, would be associated
mainly with depressive symptoms, so it could operate as a
predictive factor for this type of behavior (51). Subsequent
integrative studies have also shown that suicidal depressants
with alexithymic traits—a fact that has also been found in
relation to other psychiatric disorders as already indicated—
showed elevated blood cholesterol levels, as well as deregulation
of C-reactive protein and homocysteine. Consequently, this
would confirm to some extent, and in the absence of further
evidence, the predictions of “stress-alexithymia hypothesis” (52,
53): alexithymia could be a chronic condition of the patient,
possibly due to childhood or early adolescence in that there were
systematic abuses and/or abandonment, which would cause in
the subject a state of pronounced inflammation with an impaired
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis reactivity toward the usual
stressors of daily life. Thus, the manifestation of alexithymia
would operate as a chronic response to stress that would
complicate both psychiatric disorders and other medical
conditions (54).CONCLUSION: BRIEF FINAL THOUGHTS
To a certain extent, the historical debate on the issue of
alexithymia is readily understandable when observed from
an epistemological perspective, as it actually involves a rerun
of the age-old conflict between basic and applied science,January 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1026
López-Muñoz and Pérez-Fernández History of Alexithymia Conceptwhich in this case takes the form of a showdown between the
therapist’s clinical observation and the critical eye of
experimental methodology. Although it is true to say that
Nemiah and Sifneos do not “discover” alexithymia—in fact,
the latter has earned greater fame than the former by given it
its name and investing more effort in its definition and
disclosure— they should be granted the merit of managing
to formulate a coherent explanatory model that integrates a
long tradition of real and systematic medical observations
that pointed toward a problem that basic research not only
had failed to resolve, but had not even detected.
The collateral circumstance whereby the problem that Sifneos
systemizes, more than psychological, constitutes a basically
medical matter, had a great influence in its subsequent
treatment when one considers the fact that, at least in its
orthodox origin, psychoanalysis was the medical school of
psychology par excellence. This was not only because it was
inspired by a doctor such as Freud, but also because of its
profoundly organic and deterministic approach incapable of
understanding a mental problem that had not previously had a
biological cause. Hence the reason that for a long time it attracted
the interest of the general medical profession—and of psychiatry in
particular—and also that the first treatments of these observations
that would end up constituting alexithymia acquired a
marked psychoanalytical and psychosomatic bias, closely
interrelated, that would define its future. Possibly, the resistance
that the psychopathology of a more empirical bias initially faced
regarding the construct’s acceptance therefore involved a great deal of
prejudice. It is possible that the issue in this case, more than its
operative value, its empirical referents, or its epistemological
underpinnings, lay in its debated and debatable origins.Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 7The natural, and logical, tendency of basic research of not
accepting models and approaches that do no not arise from
within it led in this matter—as in others—to fierce
discussions that, if we pay attention to the precedent,
have less to do with the real therapeutic problem
that alexithymia sought to define and operationalize than
with its possible explanation and subsequent fit within
the framework of the theoretical underpinnings of
psychology and psychiatry. In fact, and this is very
common among the more reductionist sectors of the
psychological explanation, there is a tendency to forget
with consummate ease that the psychological and the
organic mutual ly influence each other, considering
mater ia l i s t explanat ions a s ingle direct ion in this
relationship, which tends to mean that they are often
partial and confusing. It therefore involved, as is often the
ca se w i th the se con f ron ta t i ons tha t r e i gn i t e the
perennial conflict between science and practice, a debate
on scientific primogeniture. Or, to put it another way, of
a potentially sterile discussion between the nature of things
and their value of use. Both questions may be perfectly
legitimate, yet what is certain, as in the case that concerns
us here, is that they are doomed to understand each other.AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
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